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Abstract
Voting decisions in high-stakes referendums can have crucial consequences for the fate of national governments and the
implementation of major reforms. Prior studies have found that referendum campaigns can substantially influence their
outcomes. Yet few have taken into account the fact that the effect of campaign arguments depends on a number of factors,
including individual knowledge levels and the degree of uncertainty surrounding the alternatives on the ballot. In this study
we investigate how political knowledge and campaign arguments stressing risks and opportunities influenced vote choice
in Colombia’s 2016 peace referendum. Drawing on a nationally representative survey (Study 1) and an original experiment
(Study 2), we find that stressing the opportunities that the peace deal could bring to the country, rather than the risks
associated with failing to conclude it, increased the probability that Colombians voted Yes in the referendum.While highly
knowledgeable voters were more likely to support the deal than those with little knowledge, we find that pro-referendum
opportunity arguments reduced the gap between these two groups by increasing the likelihood of a Yes vote among those
with little knowledge. These findings contribute to research on voting behavior and campaign effects in direct democracies.
Additionally, by exploring the crucial issue of attitudes towards peace, our findings also have important implications for
countries trying to secure citizens’ approval of high-stakes issues—such as negotiating the end of decades of war—through
democratic instruments.
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1. Introduction
Using direct democratic consultations (such as referen-
dums) as a tool of political decision-making—on a range
of issues from the implementation of new policies to the
approval of constitutional reforms—remains controver-
sial. While critics of direct democracy have often claimed
that citizens are not sufficiently qualified to partici-
pate directly in policy making (Budge, 1996; Matsusaka,
2003), others have provided evidence that citizens can
make competent decisions in consultations in the United
States (Bowler & Donovan, 1998), Switzerland (Colombo,
2018; Kriesi, 2005), and various European countries
(Hobolt, 2009).1 The results of at least three controver-
sial referendums that took place in 2016 in countries as
diverse as the UK (on whether to remain in the EU), Italy
1 For a review of the consequences of the use of referendums in modern democracies, see Qvortrup (2005).
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(on a constitutional reform) and Colombia (on a peace
agreement between the government and the country’s
main rebel group) have reignited the debate on the legit-
imacy of direct democracy when it comes to voting on
crucial matters.
The consequences of referendums are also a matter
of contention. There is evidence that direct-democratic
initiatives can spur political engagement (see, for exam-
ple, Tolbert, Grummel, & Smith, 2001; Donovan, Tolbert,
& Smith, 2009), but research from Latin American coun-
tries with a strong tradition of presidentialism shows
that populist presidents can use referendums to manip-
ulate the consensus and undermine legislative opposi-
tion (Breuer, 2007, 2009; Durán-Martínez, 2012; Walker,
2003).2 This debate, and the increasing popularity of
direct democracy worldwide (Altman, 2011), highlights
the importance of investigating how citizensmake voting
decisions on high-stakes referendum proposals. In this
studywe empirically examine the determinants of voting
behavior in referendums, concretely exploring whether
information influences citizens’ support for this type
of consultations.
There is recent evidence that the information de-
livered during referendum campaigns can significantly
affect voting behavior (Christin, Hug, & Sciarini, 2002;
Colombo, 2018; De Vreese, 2007; Gherghina & Silagadze,
2019; Hobolt, 2005; Kriesi, 2005). Yet the question of
whether campaign arguments can have asymmetric ef-
fects in direct democratic consultations has been largely
overlooked (LeDuc, 2002; Morisi, 2016). Referendums
contain two intrinsically different vote choices: citizens
can either vote Yes to an uncertain change or No tomain-
tain the status quo. Given the unknown potential effects
of the proposed change, campaign messages can be ex-
pected to have differential effects when they focus on
the consequences of a referendum proposal. How do vot-
ers react to arguments that stress the risks or opportuni-
ties related to the outcome of a direct democratic consul-
tation? Furthermore, it is unclear whether the effects of
these campaign messages differ depending on individu-
als’ levels of knowledge, given that relatively uninformed
voters tend to prefer to maintain the status quo com-
pared to those who are more politically sophisticated
(Barber, Gordon, Hill, & Price, 2017; Bowler & Donovan,
1998; Christin et al., 2002; Kriesi, 2005). Can information
balance the gap between voters with low and high levels
of political knowledge with regard to support for a refer-
endum proposal?
We address these questions by focusing on the refer-
endum proposed by Colombia’s former president, Juan
Manuel Santos, in October 2016 to obtain popular ap-
proval for a peace agreement his government had nego-
tiated with the rebel group of the Revolutionary Armed
Forces of Colombia (FARC) over a period of about six
years. The decision to either approve or reject the deal
involved various risks and opportunities. While support-
ers of the agreement chiefly framed it as an opportu-
nity to end over five decades of civil war, the opposition
stressed the risks of admitting the members of a “terror-
ist group” into Colombia’s political system and society.
To investigate the role of both information and polit-
ical knowledge in influencing voting preferences, we an-
alyze two data sources: a nationally representative sur-
vey thatwas fielded by the Latin American Public Opinion
Project (LAPOP) in the two months preceding the refer-
endum (Study 1), and an experimental study that we con-
ducted shortly before the vote with a convenience sam-
ple of voters (Study 2). Our findings show that stressing
the opportunities of the peace deal increased the proba-
bility that citizens voted Yes in the referendum. Although
highly knowledgeable voters weremore likely to support
the deal than those with low levels of knowledge, pro-
deal opportunity arguments reduced the gap between
these two groups by increasing the likelihood of a Yes
vote among those with less political knowledge. Cam-
paign arguments that stressed the risks involved in the
peace agreement or the opportunities associated with
maintaining the status quo did not affect voting prefer-
ences. These findings contribute to our knowledge of
voting behavior and campaign effects in direct democ-
racy, and, by examining the crucial issue of attitudes to-
wards peace, have important implications for countries
that aim to strengthen peace settlements and imple-
ment conflict resolution reforms by involving the popu-
lation through democratic mechanisms.
2. The Colombian Peace Agreement
After several failed attempts to sign a peace agreement
with FARC,3 in 2012 the Colombian government—led by
Santos—started a new round of negotiations with the
insurgents and agreed to an agenda that defined six
key issues for negotiation.4 In January 2013, as the ne-
gotiations progressed, Santos proposed a plebiscite to
approve any potential agreement, even if he was not
legally mandated to so do.5 After four years of intense
talks and several setbacks and delays, in June 2016 both
parties announced a bilateral ceasefire and defined the
conditions for the demobilization and reintegration of
FARC. In September they announced and signed their
2 For a positive example of referendums as a counter-power tool in Bolivia, see Welp & Lissidini (2016).
3 Before 2012, three different Colombian governments unsuccessfully attempted to negotiate with FARC: in 1984, 1991 and 1998. For a brief descrip-
tion of these negotiations, see González Posso (2004). For recent summaries and analysis of the Colombian conflict more generally, see Steele (2017,
Chapters 2 and 3) and Vargas and Caruso (2014).
4 The six items included comprehensive rural reform; political participation by former rebels; the cessation of hostilities and disarmament; a comprehen-
sive solution to the illicit drugs problem; establishment of a special system for truth, justice, reparations and non-repetition; and, mechanisms for the
implementation and verification of the agreement.
5 According to Colombian legislation, the consultation was defined as a “plebiscite” because the minimum turnout threshold was reduced to 13 per-
cent from the 25 percent required for referendums. For consistency with the majority of studies on direct democracy, we refer to this consultation as
a referendum.
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final agreement. The main aim of the deal was to end
conflict with the country’s strongest rebel group fight-
ing one of the longest-running internal wars in the West-
ern hemisphere, which killed approximately 220,000
people between 1958 and 2012 (Grupo de Memoria
Histórica, 2013).
The popular consultation took place on October 2.
Despite opinion polls suggestingwide support, the peace
agreement was rejected by a razor-thin margin: “No”
won with 50.2 percent of the vote. Turnout was low, at
less than 38 percent of the electorate. Following the un-
expected result, the government resumed its negotia-
tions with FARC and Congress approved a revised deal
at the end of November 2016.
Throughout the negotiations and during the refer-
endum campaign, two factions emerged among elites:
Santos and his administration strongly supported the ne-
gotiations and urged the population to vote Yes, while
Álvaro Uribe Vélez, a very popular former president who
is credited with militarily weakening the FARC, fiercely
opposed the process and campaigned for No. Matanock
and Garbiras-Díaz (2018, p. 15) described the referen-
dum as “a battle of narratives between divided elites”.
The No camp criticized the provisions of the peace
agreement as unjustified concessions to the rebels, and
emphasized the risks of promoting a culture of impunity
in which “terrorists” could participate in politics. The Yes
camp repeatedly emphasized the potential risks of not
approving the agreement, such as returning to deadly cy-
cles of violence and years of armed conflict. They some-
what vaguely framed the deal as a historical opportunity
for peace, reconciliation, and social and economic devel-
opment without citing specific provisions of the agree-
ment. As Arjona (2016) noted, the government failed to
explain how the components contained real opportuni-
ties for change.
Given the complexity of the six-year negotiation pro-
cess that led to a final agreement of almost 300 pages
touching on a large variety of crucial themes for the fu-
ture of the country, commentators predicted that infor-
mation about the peace deal would be decisive in the
plebiscite. However, current explanations of why the ref-
erendum was rejected—and, more generally, of the de-
terminants of attitudes towards the peace deal—have fo-
cused on factors other than information and knowledge.
For example, some scholars have examined the
“violence–voting nexus”, following the lead ofWeintraub,
Vargas and Flores (2015) who provided evidence from
presidential elections that residents of areas withmoder-
ate levels of violence tend to support “peace candidates”
more than those from areas with very high or very low
levels of violence. In an early analysis shortly after the
referendum, Arjona (2016) showed that voters living in
areas that sufferedmore from violent conflict weremore
likely to support the deal (see also Fergusson & Molina,
2016). Similarly, Kreiman and Masullo (2019) found that
victims of FARC tended to support the referendummore
than victims of the paramilitaries.
By contrast, Liendo and Braithwaite (2018) found
that attitudes towards the peace process were driven
more by political preferences than by experience of vi-
olence. This is in line with evidence showing that in
Colombia and Latin America more broadly, political sup-
port for the president tends to correlate with approval of
the issues proposed in direct-democratic consultations
(Breuer, 2007; Durán-Martínez, 2012; Ruth, Welp, &
Whitehead, 2017). Furthermore,Matanock andGarbiras-
Díaz (2018) found that rebel endorsement of the agree-
ment’s electoral provisions diminished support for it.
We expect that the “information aspect” of the cam-
paign might also play an important role in explaining vot-
ing decisions in the Colombian referendum. If the cam-
paign leading up to the referendum was really a “battle
of narratives” between deeply divided elites, to what ex-
tent did the arguments fromboth camps influence voting
decisions? In the next section we advance different theo-
retical expectations building on research on campaign ef-
fects in direct democracy, which we then test with both
observational and experimental data.
3. Political Knowledge and Information Effects in
Referendum Campaigns
Since early research on public opinion, political knowl-
edge has been considered one of the main determinants
of political reasoning (for a review, see Delli Carpini &
Keeter, 1997). Numerous studies have shown that po-
litical sophistication and political knowledge moderate
voters’ decision-making processes (e.g., Jerit, Barabas, &
Bolsen, 2006; Slothuus & De Vreese, 2010; Zaller, 1992).
In the specific context of direct democracy, there is evi-
dence that undecided and less informed voters (Bowler
& Donovan, 1998, p. 49; Christin et al., 2002) are more
likely to vote No to a referendum proposal compared to
those with high levels of political knowledge. Similarly,
experimental evidence confirms that support for the sta-
tus quo in voting on social issues is strongest among the
least-informed individuals (Barber et al., 2017). In line
with this evidence, and considering claims that the lack
of knowledge played a central role in driving the results
of the Colombian referendum (Arjona, 2016; Idler, 2016),
we expect voters with high levels of political knowledge
to be more likely to vote Yes in the peace referendum
than those with low levels (Hypothesis 1).
While we hypothesize that individual differences in
political knowledge correlate with voting preferences in
direct democracy, we can expect that voters also react
to campaign messages supporting both sides of a refer-
endum campaign, and that the influence of such mes-
sages is moderated by their pre-existing levels of knowl-
edge. Drawing on the literatures on framing (for a re-
view, see Chong & Druckman, 2007) and information ef-
fects in elections (e.g., Alvarez, 1997; Bartels, 1996) and
referendum campaigns (Christin et al., 2002; De Vreese,
2007; Hobolt, 2009; Kriesi, 2005), we can derive two com-
peting expectations about how messages that stress the
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risks and opportunities involved in a referendum pro-
posal should influence voting preferences.
The first expectation draws on prospect theory and
studies on loss aversion (Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler,
1991). Research in political and social psychology has
stressed that negative information tends to have a
stronger influence on political decisions than positive in-
formation (for a review, see Peeters & Czapinski, 1990;
Soroka, 2014), partially because of a “negativity bias”
in individuals’ reactions to negative events compared
to positive ones (Rozin & Royzman, 2001). Evidence
from health communication points in this direction, in-
dicating that by motivating preventive health behav-
ior, “loss-framed” messages are more persuasive than
“gain-framed” ones (Schneider et al., 2001). Additional
evidence confirms that negative economic information
has a stronger impact on individuals’ attitudes than
positive information (Soroka, 2006). Building on these
premises, we argue that if “losses loom larger than
gains” (Kahneman & Tversky, 1984), “risk arguments”
(which stress the risks related to either accepting or re-
jecting a referendum proposal) should be more persua-
sive than “opportunity arguments” (which highlight the
opportunities involved on both sides of a referendum)
(Hypothesis 2a).
The competing expectation draws on the
“uncertainty-reduction” effect of information identified
in elections (Alvarez & Brehm, 2002) and referendums
(Hobolt, 2009). The evidence shows that arguments used
in direct democratic campaigns can influence voting pref-
erences not only by persuading voters, but also by mod-
ifying their levels of uncertainty (LeDuc, 2002; Morisi,
2016). A key assumption is that the value that voters at-
tribute to a referendum proposal increases as the uncer-
tainty related to the proposal decreases (Hobolt, 2009,
pp. 40–50). Therefore, campaign arguments that stress
the opportunities of either accepting a referendum pro-
posal or maintaining the status quo should be particu-
larly persuasive because they directly reduce the uncer-
tainty related to these options. However, risk arguments
are based on a somewhatmore complex reasoning. They
indirectly promote referendum options by pointing out
the drawbacks of their alternatives and predict what
could happen if the referendum is approved/rejected;
thus they are less likely to reduce uncertainty. Follow-
ing this reasoning, therefore, we can expect opportunity
messages to be more persuasive than risk messages, be-
cause they reduce the uncertainty related to referendum
options (Hypothesis 2b). In addition, we can expect such
an effect to be particularly large when the arguments
stress the opportunities related to approving (instead of
rejecting) a referendum proposal, since in most cases—
such as Colombia’s peace referendum—the uncertain-
ties related to the “change option” (i.e., voting Yes) are
higher than those associated withmaintaining the status
quo (Hobolt, 2009, pp. 40–50; LeDuc, 2002).
Lastly, we can assume that individual political knowl-
edge should moderate the effect of campaign argu-
ments. Kam (2005) has argued that voters’ pre-existing
knowledge levels influence the reception of campaign
messages. More specifically, experimental evidence has
shown that voters with low levels of knowledge aremore
likely to be influenced by the content of campaign mes-
sages than those with high levels (Lee, Herr, Kardes, &
Kim, 1999; Schuck & De Vreese, 2006; Slothuus & De
Vreese, 2010). One of the main reasons for this find-
ing is that people with low knowledge lack the nec-
essary “ammunition with which to counterargue” per-
suasive messages (Taber & Lodge, 2006, p. 757). Thus,
we hypothesize that campaign arguments—regardless of
whether they focus on the risks or the opportunities of
the referendum—should have a stronger effect on those
with low political knowledge compared to those with
high knowledge (Hypothesis 3).
In the next two sections we empirically test these
expectations using data from two separate studies—a
nationally representative survey to test H1 (Study 1)
and an experiment conducted in the weeks preceding
the Colombian referendum to test the other hypothe-
ses (Study 2). While Study 1 allows us to identify the de-
terminants of voting preferences and in particular the
role of political knowledge in a representative sample
of Colombian voters, Study 2 provides causal evidence
of how campaign arguments influenced support for the
peace agreement.
4. Study 1: LAPOP Survey
4.1. Data and Measures
Between 2016 and 2017, the LAPOP of Vanderbilt Univer-
sity conducted the most recent round of the Americas
Barometer surveys. This article analyzes data from the
survey conducted in Colombia between August 3 and
October 29, 2016 in conjunction with the Observatorio
de la Democracia of the Universidad de los Andes, which
included questions on the peace referendum. Face-to-
face interviews were conducted using a national proba-
bility sample of voters that was selected using a multi-
stage probability design with geographical regions, mu-
nicipality size, and urbanization as the main strata. Our
analysis excludes respondents who were interviewed on
the day of the referendum or afterwards (N = 207),
which leaves us with a total sample of 1,356 respondents
(a complete description of the variables, summary statis-
tics and question wording are available in the Appendix.)
Our main dependent variable is a measure of respon-
dents’ voting intentions in the event that a referendum
was used to ratify the agreement, which we recode as a
binary choice variable with a value of 1 for those who in-
tended to vote Yes, and a value of 0 otherwise (excluding
“Don’t know” and no response)6. In alternative models,
6 The question reads as follows: “in the event that a popular vote will be held to endorse the peace agreement between the government and the FARC,
how would you vote?” Possible answers included: “I would vote in favor”, “I would vote against”, “I would not vote”, “Don’t know”, “No reply”.
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we use either a dummy variable with Yes votes versus
No votes (excluding all other options), or a choice vari-
able that includes three categories (voting Yes, voting No,
and not voting).
Tomeasure political knowledge, we combined the re-
sponses to three questions about factual knowledge in
an additive index, which we subsequently dichotomized
into two categories to increase comparability with the
experimental design: a “high knowledge” category (cor-
responding to the one-third of respondents who re-
sponded correctly to all three questions) and a “low
knowledge” category for all others7. In Appendix A, we
replicate the analysis using two alternative measures of
knowledge: self-assessed knowledge level or frequency
of attention to political news in the media.
In addition to the measures of political knowledge,
in the regression analysis we control for standard demo-
graphics such as age, education, and in particular gender,
since research has shown that women are less likely to
support referendumproposals that involve a high degree
of uncertainty (Verge, Guinjoan, & Rodon, 2015).We also
include other covariates thatmight influence both voting
intentions and knowledge, such asmonthly household in-
come and respondents’ self-perception of their personal
economic situation, since previous studies show that eco-
nomic evaluations (Clarke, Kornberg, & Wearing, 2000)
and economic expectations (De Vreese & Boomgaarden,
2005) are key determinants of vote choice in direct demo-
cratic consultations in Europe. Lastly, we control for trust
in the president and vote choice in the 2014 presiden-
tial election, since prior studies have found that trust in
the government (Kriesi, 2005), government approval (De
Vreese & Boomgaarden, 2005), and partisan considera-
tions (e.g., Christin et al., 2002; Colombo & Kriesi, 2017;
Kriesi, 2005) are strong predictors of voting behavior in
referendums (on presidential approval, see also Breuer,
2007, 2009; Durán-Martínez, 2012; Walker, 2003).
4.2. Results
Figure 1 displays the results from our full logistic regres-
sion model of the intention to vote Yes in the referen-
dumon the peace agreement. As the plot shows, political
knowledge is positively and significantly correlated with
the probability of voting Yes, even when all covariates
are included in the model. Depending on model speci-
fications (see Table A2 in Appendix A), those with a high
level of political knowledge are 9–11 percentage points
more likely to vote Yes than those with low levels of polit-
ical knowledge, keeping all other factors constant. Alter-
native specifications confirm the existence of a substan-
tial and significant correlation: those who perceive them-
selves as having a very high level of political knowledge
are 14–19 percentage points more likely to vote Yes than
those with a very low level of perceived political knowl-
edge, while those who look for political news in the me-
dia on a daily basis are 11–16 percentage points more
likely to vote Yes than thosewhonever look for news (see
Table A4 in Appendix A). These findings confirm our ex-
pectation (H1) that a higher level of political knowledge
is associated with a higher probability of supporting the
referendum proposal.
In alternative binomial logistic regressions, we find
that a high level of knowledge also correlates with the
intention to vote Yes compared to the intention to vote
No, although the effect is marginally significant at the
0.1 level (see Table A5 and Figure A1 in Appendix A).
When we run multinomial logistic regressions, however,
we find that a high level of knowledge significantly cor-
relates with Yes votes compared to non-voters, but not
to No votes. These results suggest that the positive ef-
fect of knowledge on support for the peace agreement
operates mainly through a “mobilization channel”, in
line with evidence that political knowledge influences
turnout (Larcinese, 2007). In other words, those who
know more about politics are more likely to both vote in
the referendum and to vote Yes compared to those who
know less, while political knowledge has no effect on the
probability of voting No.
In addition to highlighting the role of knowledge, the
regression results reveal other determinants of voting in
the Colombian referendum that resemble those identi-
fied in research on other direct democratic consultations.
Figure 1 shows that the strongest predictors of voting
preferences are trust in the president and past vote for
President Santos: moving from no trust at all to com-
plete trust in the president increases the chances of a
Yes vote by 45 percentage points, while those who voted
for Santos in the 2014 election are 21 percentage points
more likely to vote Yes than those who did not vote. Ad-
ditional models show that presidential approval is also
a crucial determinant of Yes votes (see Table A3 in Ap-
pendix A). These findings support previous evidence that
presidents play a key role in influencing voting behavior
in referendums in Latin America (Durán-Martínez, 2012).
In addition, the findings confirm that those whose eco-
nomic situation improved over the past 12 months are
significantly more likely to vote Yes than those whose
economic situation remained stable, and that women
are less likely to vote for a change than men—a finding
that confirms the existence of a gender gap in support
for direct democratic proposals involving a degree of un-
certainty (Verge et al., 2015).
5. Study 2
5.1. Experimental Sample
Although the analysis of the LAPOP data allows us to test
the effect of political knowledge in a representative sam-
ple of voters, the observational nature of the survey pre-
vents us from exploring the potential causal effects of in-
7 The three questions are: “What is the name of the current president of the United States of America?”; “On what continent is Nigeria?”; and “How long
is the presidential term in Colombia?”. Replies have been coded with a value of 1 for correct answers, and a value of 0 otherwise.
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High knowledge
Gender (female)
Age
Years of Schooling
Income (2nd quinle)
Income (3rd quinle)
Income (4th quinle)
Income (5th quinle)
Income (missing)
Economy got beer
Economy got worse
Trust in the president
Voted for Santos
Voted for Zuluaga
Voted for other candidate
–.2 –.1 0 .1 .2
Correlaons with intenons to vote Yes
.3 .4 .5
Figure 1. Determinants of intentions to vote Yes to the peace agreement. Notes: Average marginal effects based on lo-
gistic regressions (Model 3 in Table A2 in Appendix A, N = 1261). Dependent variable: intention to vote Yes in the peace
agreement referendum. Horizontal lines correspond to 95 percent confidence intervals.
formation on voting preferences. How did voters react
to the different arguments highlighting the opportunity
and risks involved in the Colombian peace agreement?
To answer this question and address our theoretical
predictions, we conducted an experimental study in the
few days between the signature of the peace agreement
in Cartagena (September 26, 2016) and the day of the ref-
erendum (October 2, 2016). The experiment was fielded
online and included a convenience sample of 478 eligi-
ble Colombian voters, recruited mostly through readers
of the magazine Vice Colombia and students of Javeri-
ana University. The median age of our sample was 32
years, and the respondentswere 58 percentwomen. Our
sample differed importantly from the average Colombian
citizen, since it included mostly residents of Bogota (66
percent), university students (43 percent), and a large
share of supporters of the peace agreement (79 percent
of the participants in the control group intended to vote
Yes). Balance tests indicate that there are no major dif-
ferences between the treatment groups and the control
group with regard to the socio-demographic dimensions
recorded in the study (see Table C2 in Appendix C).
Considering the nature of our experimental sample,
we should necessarily be cautious about extending the
results from Study 2 to the entire Colombian electorate.
Although recent evidence shows that experimental esti-
mates fromconvenience samples (including student sam-
ples) are similar to those obtained from national sam-
ples (Coppock, 2018; Coppock, Leeper, & Mullinix, 2018;
Druckman & Kam, 2011; Mullinix, Leeper, Druckman, &
Freese, 2016), it is possible that the effect size of risk and
opportunity arguments would differ within a population-
based sample. For example, we might expect the infor-
mation effects to be larger if our sample included a larger
share of low-knowledge voters (in line with the evidence
reviewed above), or we might expect the effect of pro-
peace agreement arguments to be smaller if our sample
included more opponents of the peace deal, in line with
the theory ofmotivated reasoning (Lodge& Taber, 2013),
as discussed below.
However, we do not envisage strong reasons why
the direction of the average treatment effects should be
substantially different within a nationally representative
sample. Why would a group of voters, including a large
share of young university students, react to risk and op-
portunity arguments in a markedly different way than
the general electorate? Although we cannot address this
question directly, we inspected whether students’ vot-
ing patterns differed significantly from non-students us-
ing LAPOP data. The analysis indicates that: a) being a
student does not correlate with the probability of vot-
ing Yes, once we control for the other factors included in
previous analysis; b) students do not differ significantly
in their voting intentions from the rest of the sample
(see Table A7 in Appendix A); and c) the determinants
of Yes votes are substantially the same for students and
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non-students, although the precision of the estimates
changes due to the small number of students in the
LAPOP survey (see Figure A2 in Appendix A). For these
reasons, we believe that our experimental study can pro-
vide valid estimates, even if we should keep in mind the
limitations related to a convenience sample of voters.
5.2. Experimental Design
After replying to a few socio-demographic questions, the
participants in Study 2 were randomly assigned to one of
five experimental conditions, as summarized in Table 1.
Those assigned to the treatment groups read a short ar-
gument of around 70 words that was either in favor (pro
argument) or against (con argument) the peace agree-
ment. The texts highlighted either the risks or the op-
portunities of both sides of the referendum campaign,
and were created on the basis of the main arguments
used in the campaign debate inmajor news outlets. Thus,
the participantswere not exposed to fictional arguments,
but only to publicly available information. Deceptionwas
not used in the experiment.
To illustrate, the following is the English translation
of the argument stressing the opportunities of the peace
deal thatwe presented inGroup 1 (the complete list of ar-
guments and the original wording in Spanish is available
in Appendix E):
Those who support the Yes argue that voting Yes in
the referendum constitutes a historical opportunity
to end violence in the country. They contend that it is
key to bringing peace to the rural areas and for the dis-
placed to come back to their lands, without poverty,
landmines and illicit crops. Victims will know what
happened with their beloved ones, will be repaired
and non-repetitionwill be guaranteed. They see in the
referendum an opportunity to decide if we want to
end the war.
After reading the text, we asked the participantswhether
they intended to vote Yes or No to the proposed peace
agreement. Those assigned to the control group replied
to the same question without reading any informa-
tion. Voting intentions in the control condition therefore
serve as a baseline against which we measure eventual
changes in the treatment conditions. Participants then
replied to two questions about basic facts concerning the
peace agreement. Those who replied correctly to both
questions (70 percent) were assigned a value of 1 (“high
knowledge”), while the other participants (30 percent)
were assigned a value of 0 (“low knowledge”).
5.3. Results
Table 2 summarizes the results of different logistic re-
gressions in which we estimate whether the intention to
vote Yes differed by group assignment, with the control
group set as the reference category. As Model 1 shows,
pro arguments that stressed opportunities related to
the peace agreement significantly increased participants’
likelihood of voting Yes. However, pro arguments that
stressed the risks of a No vote and the arguments used by
the opponents of the peace agreement (con arguments)
had no influence on voting preferences. The results are
substantially similar in Model 2, in which we introduce
socio-demographic covariates to increase the precision
of the estimates (Angrist & Pischke, 2009, pp. 23–44).
The results from the regression analysis therefore
partially support H2b (but not H2a) that campaign argu-
ments should be more persuasive when they highlight
the opportunities (instead of the risks) related to a refer-
endum proposal, although the effect applies only to the
arguments that support a Yes vote. By contrast, the argu-
ments against the peace deal do not seem to influence
participants’ voting preferences significantly.
Next, we tested whether the observed effects dif-
fered depending on whether the participants correctly
answered factual questions related to the peace agree-
ment. First, analysis of the participants in the control
condition confirms that those with high levels of knowl-
edge were significantly more likely to vote Yes than
those with low levels, which is in line with the survey
results. However, the negative interaction coefficients
in Models 3 and 4 indicate that the effect of pro-deal
opportunity arguments is significantly lower for those
with high political knowledge compared to those with
low political knowledge. The difference between these
two groups of voters is evident when we plot the av-
erage marginal effects in Figure 2. If we first consider
all the participants, the left-hand plot of Figure 2 con-
firms that pro-opportunity arguments increase the prob-
ability of voting for the peace agreement by 13 percent-
age points compared to no information. When we break
down the effects by level of knowledge (right-hand plot),
we find that pro-opportunity arguments increase the like-
lihood of voting Yes by 30 percentage points among low-
knowledge participants, while the effect is not significant
among their high-knowledge counterparts. These find-
Table 1. Design of the Experiment.
No information Opportunity arguments Risk arguments
Control group Group 1 (PRO) Group 2 (CON) Group 3 (PRO) Group 4 (CON)
Opportunity Opportunity Risk Risk
of voting Yes of voting No of voting No of voting Yes
(N = 95) (N = 94) (N = 96) (N = 96) (N = 97)
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Table 2. Treatment effects on support for peace agreement.
Intentions to vote Yes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treatment groups (ref: control)
— Group 1 1.053** 0.822* 2.391** 2.498**
(opportunity — PRO) (0.447) (0.474) (1.079) (1.116)
— Group 2 0.288 0.246 0.578 0.789
(opportunity — CON) (0.372) (0.401) (0.549) (0.594)
— Group 3 0.214 −0.002 0.550 0.349
(risk — PRO) (0.367) (0.400) (0.578) (0.618)
— Group 4 0.636 0.455 1.004 0.978
(risk — CON) 0.636 0.455 1.004 0.978
High knowledge 0.388 1.466*** 1.240**
(0.302) (0.551) (0.595)
Group 1 × High knowledge −2.314* −2.502**
(1.229) (1.272)
Group 2 × High knowledge −0.888 −1.084
(0.786) (0.829)
Group 3 × High knowledge −1.008 −0.756
(0.793) (0.832)
Group 4 × High knowledge −1.061 −1.020
(0.861) (0.907)
Gender (female) 0.566* 0.576*
(0.295) (0.302)
Age −0.028** −0.031***
(0.011) (0.012)
High education 0.591** 0.608**
(0.292) (0.295)
Employment (ref = working, not student)
— Unemployed, not student −0.334 −0.251
(0.397) (0.409)
— Student −0.065 −0.050
(0.361) (0.362)
Living in Bogotá 0.037 −0.036
(0.297) (0.303)
Constant 1.322*** 1.753*** 0.654* 1.462**
(0.252) (0.676) (0.342) (0.702)
Pseudo R2 .018 .096 .042 .109
N 478 472 472 472
Notes: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Coefficients are log-odds based on logistic regressions (for average marginal effects see
Table C3 in Appendix C). Dependent variable: intention to vote Yes versus other options. Standard errors in parentheses.
ings support the expectation that information about a
referendum proposal has a greater impact when voters
know less about the content of the proposal (H3).
Lastly, we investigated why the arguments used by
the opponents of the referendumdid not reduce support
for the peace agreement within our sample. The analysis
in Appendix D suggests that the presence of disconfirma-
tion bias and the complexity of risk messages might ex-
plain this lack of effect.
6. Conclusions
The results of a recent wave of direct-democratic consul-
tations that took place in Europe and Latin America has
made clear that voting decisions in high-stakes referen-
dums can have substantial consequences for the fate of
national governments and the implementation of major
reforms. The case of the 2016 Colombian referendum re-
veals that opening up a peace process to direct consul-
tation with the population can potentially derail years of
negotiation, even in a country where one would expect
wide popular support for measures to end a long and
bloody civil war (Flores & Vargas, 2018). Moreover, al-
though the government eventuallymanaged to ratify the
peace deal despite the opposition of a (minimal) major-
ity of Colombian voters, policy experts argue that peace
in Colombia cannot be maintained without popular con-
sent (e.g., Llorente, 2016). Even if the deal is now sealed,
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Figure 2. Effects of pro arguments on intention to vote Yes. Notes: Marginal effects based on models 1 and 3 in Table 2.
Value 0 on Y-axis equal to control group. Vertical bars correspond to 90 percent confidence intervals.
successful implementation is likely to hinge largely on
popular support, especially after Iván Duque, who has
been openly critical of the peace agreement, became
president. With so much at stake, understanding the de-
terminants of political attitudes towards peace and vot-
ing behavior more generally becomes even more rele-
vant for the country’s future.
Our findings provide evidence that information plays
a crucial role in influencing voting preferences in high-
stakes referendums. More specifically, they indicate that
voters in this type of direct democratic consultation care
more about the opportunities that approving a proposal
could potentially imply for them and their country than
the possible risks associated with its rejection. Further-
more, we show that political knowledge plays a central
role in both determining voting preferences and in the
reception of information in two ways. First, we find that
in the 2016 Colombian referendum, higher levels of po-
litical knowledge are associated with a higher probability
of voting Yes. Knowledge seems to influence support for
the proposal mostly by mobilizing potential Yes voters,
since thosewho knowmore about politics aremore likely
to both vote and to vote Yes than those who know less
about politics. Second, positive arguments that stress the
opportunities of the referendum proposal have a greater
influence on poorly informed voters. This suggests that
when a referendum concerns a salient but complex pro-
posal, information is especially crucial for those with low
levels of political knowledge.
It is important, however, to highlight the limitations
of the sample in Study 2, which included a higher share
of “Yes voters” and highly educated voters than the gen-
eral population. Therefore, we cannot exclude the possi-
bility that our “con arguments” would have had a differ-
ent effect in a representative sample with a larger share
of No voters. In line with the theory of motivated rea-
soning (e.g., Lodge & Taber, 2013), it might be the case
that campaign arguments are persuasive as long as they
“resonate” with respondents’ prior attitudes towards a
referendum proposal. Besides these limitations, the fact
that we do find information effects in a “hard case”—
that is, a campaign in which the stakes were high and
in a study conducted just a few days before the crucial
vote—strengthens the contribution of our findings.
Finally, the implications of our findings for securing
peace making and peace building extend beyond Colom-
bia. Although attempting to seal a peace deal with a ref-
erendum is not a common strategy, the number of civil
wars in countries where elections take place is growing
(Matanock & García-Sánchez, 2017). This suggests that
understanding how to successfully harness (electoral)
support for peace might be crucial for political leaders
in conflict-affected countries working to end armed strife
through negotiated settlements. For Colombia and other
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countries facing the historical opportunity to end war
through democratic solutions, understanding citizens’ at-
titudes about the risks and opportunities involved in a
peace process is a key step towards securing broad pop-
ular support for a peaceful future.
Acknowledgments
We are grateful to all those who kindly took the time to
answer our questionnaire; to Juan Camilo Maldonado,
Manuel Salamanca, Lucas Sánchez and Vice Colombia for
supporting us with the recruitment of participants; and
to Javier Fernando Torres and Andrés Vargas for provid-
ing advice to improve the study.
Conflict of Interests
The authors declare no conflict of interests.
References
Altman, D. (2011). Direct democracy worldwide. Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press.
Alvarez, M. R. (1997). Information and elections. Ann Ar-
bor, MI: The University of Michigan Press.
Alvarez, M. R., & Brehm, J. (2002). Hard choices, easy an-
swers. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Angrist, J. D., & Pischke, J.-S. (2009). Mostly harmless
econometrics: An empiricist’s companion. Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press.
Arjona, A. (2016). War dynamics and the “NO” vote
in the Colombian referendum. Political Violence at
a Glance. Retrieved from http://politicalviolence
ataglance.org/2016/10/20/war-dynamics-and-the-
no-vote-in-the-colombian-referendum
Barber, M., Gordon, D., Hill, R., & Price, J. (2017). Status
quo bias in ballot wording. Journal of Experimental
Political Science, 4(2), 151–160.
Bartels, L. M. (1996). Uninformed votes: Information ef-
fects in presidential elections. American Journal of
Political Science, 40(1), 194–230.
Bowler, S., & Donovan, T. (1998). Demanding choices.
Opinion, voting and direct democracy. Ann Arbor, MI:
University of Michigan Press.
Breuer, A. (2007). Institutions of direct democracy and
accountability in Latin America’s presidential democ-
racies. Democratization, 14(4), 554–579.
Breuer, A. (2009). The use of government-initiated refer-
endums in Latin America. Towards a theory of referen-
dum cases. Revista de Ciencia Política, 29(1), 23–55.
Budge, I. (1996). The new challenge of direct democracy.
Cambridge: Polity Press.
Chong, D., & Druckman, J. N. (2007). Framing theory. An-
nual Review of Political Science, 10(1), 103–126.
Christin, T., Hug, S., & Sciarini, P. (2002). Interests and in-
formation in referendum voting: An analysis of Swiss
voters. European Journal of Political Research, 41(6),
759–776.
Clarke, H. D., Kornberg, A., & Wearing, P. (2000). A polity
on the edge: Canada and the politics of fragmenta-
tion. Peterborough: Broadview Press.
Colombo, C. (2018). Justifications and citizen compe-
tence in direct democracy: A multilevel analysis.
British Journal of Political Science, 48(3), 787–806.
Colombo, C., & Kriesi, H. (2017). Party, policy—Or both?
Partisan-biased processing of policy arguments in di-
rect democracy. Journal of Elections, Public Opinion
and Parties, 27(3), 235–253.
Coppock, A. (2018). Generalizing from survey experi-
ments conducted on mechanical turk: A replication
approach. Political Science Research and Methods,
2018, 1–16. https://doi.org/10.1017/psrm.2018.10
Coppock, A., Leeper, T. J., & Mullinix, K. J. (2018). Gen-
eralizability of heterogeneous treatment effect esti-
mates across samples. Proceedings of the National
Academy of Sciences of the United States of America,
115(49), 12441–12446.
De Vreese, C. H. (Ed.). (2007). The dynamics of referen-
dum campaigns: An international perspective. Bas-
ingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
De Vreese, C. H., & Boomgaarden, H. G. (2005). Project-
ing EU referendums. Fear of immigration and sup-
port for European integration. European Union Poli-
tics, 6(1), 59–82.
Delli Carpini, M. X., & Keeter, S. (1997).What Americans
know about politics and why it matters. New Haven:
Yale University Press.
Donovan, T., Tolbert, C. J., & Smith, D. A. (2009). Politi-
cal engagement, mobilization, and direct democracy.
Public Opinion Quarterly, 73(1), 98–118.
Druckman, J. N., & Kam, C. D. (2011). Students as exper-
imental participants: A defence of the “narrow data
base.” In J. N. Druckman, D. P. Green, J. H. Kuklinski, &
A. Lupia (Eds.), Cambridge handbook of experimental
political science (pp. 41–57). Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Durán-Martínez, A. (2012). Presidents, parties, and refer-
enda in Latin America. Comparative Political Studies,
45(9), 1159–1187.
Fergusson, L., & Molina, C. (2016). Un vistazo a los
resultados del plebiscito [A glance at the results
of the pblebiscite]. La Silla Vacía. Retrieved from
https://lasillavacia.com/blogs/un-vistazo-los-
resultados-del-plebiscito-58200
Flores, T. E., & Vargas, J. F. (2018). Colombia: Democracy,
violence, and the peacebuilding challenge. Conflict
Management and Peace Science, 35(6), 581–586.
Gherghina, S., & Silagadze, N. (2019). And yet it matters:
Referendum campaigns and vote decision in Eastern
Europe. Contemporary Politics, 25(1), 29–46.
González Posso, C. (2004). Negotiations with the FARC:
1982–2002 (Conciliation Resources, No. 14). Re-
trieved from https://www.c-r.org/accord-article/
negotiations-farc-1982-2002
Grupo de Memoria Histórica. (2013). ¡Basta Ya! Colom-
bia: Memorias de guerra y dignidad [Basta ya!
Politics and Governance, 2019, Volume 7, Issue 2, Pages 242–267 251
Colombia: Memories of war and dignity]. Centro
Nacional de Memoria Histórica. Retrieved from
http://www.centrodememoriahistorica.gov.co/
micrositios/informeGeneral
Hobolt, S. B. (2005). When Europe matters: The impact
of political information on voting behaviour in EU ref-
erendums. Journal of Elections, Public Opinion & Par-
ties, 15(1), 85–109.
Hobolt, S. B. (2009). Europe in question. Referendums
on European integration. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Idler, A. (2016). Colombia just voted no on its plebiscite
for peace. Here’s why and what it means. The Wash-
ington Post. Retrieved fromhttps://www.washington
post.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/10/03/
colombia-just-voted-no-on-its-referendum-for-
peace-heres-why-and-what-it-means/?noredirect=
on&utm_term=.bb688d776897
Jerit, J., Barabas, J., & Bolsen, T. (2006). Citizens, knowl-
edge, and the information environment. American
Journal of Political Science, 50(2), 266–282.
Kahneman, D., Knetsch, J. L., & Thaler, R. H. (1991).
Anomalies: The endowment effect, loss aversion, and
status quo bias. The Journal of Economic Perspectives,
5(1), 193–206.
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1984). Choices, values, and
frames. American Psychologist, 39(4), 341–350.
Kam, C. D. (2005). Who toes the party line? Cues, values,
and individual differences. Political Behavior, 27(2),
163–182.
Kreiman, G., & Masullo, J. (2019). Who shot the bullets.
Exposure to violence and attitude towards peace. Pa-
per presented at All Souls Conflict Workshop, Univer-
sity of Oxford, UK.
Kriesi, H. (2005). Direct democratic choice. The Swiss ex-
perience. Lanham, MD: Lexington.
Larcinese, V. (2007). Does political knowledge increase
turnout? Evidence from the 1997 British general elec-
tion. Public Choice, 131(3/4), 387–411.
LeDuc, L. (2002). Opinion change and voting behaviour in
referendums. European Journal of Political Research,
41(6), 711–732.
Lee, H., Herr, P. M., Kardes, F. R., & Kim, C. (1999). Mo-
tivated search effects of choice accountability, issue
involvement, and prior knowledge on information ac-
quisition and use. Journal of Business Research, 45(1),
75–88.
Liendo, N., & Braithwaite, J. M. (2018). Determinants
of Colombian attitudes toward the peace process.
Conflict Management and Peace Science, 35(6),
622–636.
Llorente, M. V. (2016). Peace in Colombia could not have
been maintained without popular consent. New York
Times. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/
roomfordebate/2016/10/05/when-should-the-
peoples-voice-be-trusted/peace-in-colombia-
could-not-have-been-maintained-without-popular-
consent
Lodge, M., & Taber, C. S. (2013). The rationalizing voter.
Cambridge; NY: Cambridge University Press.
Matanock, A.M., & Garbiras-Díaz, N. (2018). Considering
concessions: A survey experiment on the Colombian
peace process. Conflict Management and Peace Sci-
ence, 35(6), 637–655.
Matanock, A. M., & García-Sánchez, M. (2017). The
Colombian paradox: Peace processes, elite divisions
& popular plebiscites. Daedalus, 146(4), 152–166.
Matsusaka, J. G. (2003). Direct democracy. In C. K. Row-
ley & F. Schneider (Eds.), Encyclopaedia of public
choice. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Morisi, D. (2016). Voting under uncertainty: The effect
of information in the Scottish independence referen-
dum. Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties,
26(3), 354–372.
Mullinix, K. J., Leeper, T. J., Druckman, J. N., & Freese,
J. (2016). The generalizability of survey experi-
ments. Journal of Experimental Political Science, 2(2),
109–138.
Peeters, G., & Czapinski, J. (1990). Positive-negative
asymmetry in evaluations: The distinction between
affective and informational negativity effects. Euro-
pean Review of Social Psychology, 1(1), 33–60.
Qvortrup, M. (2005). A comparative study of refer-
endums: Government by the people. Manchester:
Manchester University Press.
Rozin, P., & Royzman, E. B. (2001). Negativity bias, nega-
tivity dominance, and contagion. Personality and So-
cial Psychology Review, 5(4), 296–320.
Ruth, S. P., Welp, Y., & Whitehead, L. (2017). Let the peo-
ple rule: Direct democracy in the twenty-first century.
Colchester: ECPR Press.
Schneider, T. R., Salovey, P., Apanovitch, A. M., Pizarro,
J., McCarthy, D., Zullo, J., & Rothman, A. J. (2001).
The effects of message framing and ethnic targeting
on mammography use among low-income women.
Health Psychology, 20(4), 256–266.
Schuck, A. R. T., & De Vreese, C. H. (2006). Between
risk and opportunity. News framing and its effects on
public support for EU enlargement. European Journal
of Communication, 21(1), 5–32.
Slothuus, R., & De Vreese, C. H. (2010). Political parties,
motivated reasoning, and issue framing effects. The
Journal of Politics, 72(3), 630–645.
Soroka, S. N. (2006). Good news and bad news: Re-
sponses asymmetric information to economic infor-
mation. The Journal of Politics, 68(2), 372–385.
Soroka, S. N. (2014). Negativity in democratic politics.
Causes and consequences. New York, NY: Cambridge
University Press.
Steele, A. (2017).Democracy and displacement in Colom-
bia’s civil war. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Taber, C. S., & Lodge, M. (2006). Motivated skepticism in
the evaluation of political beliefs. American Journal
of Political Science, 50(3), 755–769.
Tolbert, C. J., Grummel, J. A., & Smith, D. A. (2001). The
effects of ballot initiatives on voter turnout in the
Politics and Governance, 2019, Volume 7, Issue 2, Pages 242–267 252
American states. American Politics Research, 29(6),
625–648.
Vargas, J. F., & Caruso, R. (2014). Conflict, crime, and vi-
olence in Colombia. Peace Economics, Peace Science
and Public Policy, 20(1), 1–4.
Verge, T., Guinjoan, M., & Rodon, T. (2015). Risk aversion,
gender, and constitutional change. Politics & Gender,
11(3), 499–521.
Walker, M. C. (2003). The strategic use of referendums.
New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan.
Weintraub, M., Vargas, J. F., & Flores, T. E. (2015). Vote
choice and legacies of violence: evidence from the
2014 Colombian presidential elections. Research &
Politics, 2(2).
Welp, Y., & Lissidini, A. (2016). Democracia directa,
poder y contrapoder: Análisis del referendo del 21 de
febrero de 2016 en Bolivia [Direct democracy, Power
and Counter-power: An analysis of the February 21,
2016 referendum in Bolivia]. Bolivian Studies Jour-
nal/Revista de Estudios Bolivianos, 22, 162–190.
Zaller, J. (1992). The nature and origins of mass opinion.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
About the Authors
Juan Masullo (PhD, EUI) is Lecturer in the Department of Politics and International Relations and
Associate Member of Nuffield College at the University of Oxford. His research interests include indi-
vidual and collective behaviour in armed conflicts, civilian protection, and citizens’ attitudes towards
policies to resolve conflict and combat crime. Before joining Oxford, he was Postdoctoral Fellow at
the Bremen International Graduate School of Social Science and Research Fellow at Yale’s Program on
Order, Conflict and Violence.
Davide Morisi is an Assistant Professor in political science at Collegio Carlo Alberto in Turin (Italy). His
research focuses on political behaviour, public opinion, and political psychology, with a specific focus
on direct democracy and referendum campaigns. Davide obtained his PhD at the European Univer-
sity Institute in 2016. He has held positions as postdoctoral researcher at University of Vienna, and as
visiting researcher at New York University, Copenhagen University, and University of Edinburgh.
Politics and Governance, 2019, Volume 7, Issue 2, Pages 242–267 253
Appendix A. Study 1 (LAPOP), analysis.
Table A1. Summary statistics.
Percentage (out of total N)
Intend to vote Yes 39.4 (1296)
Intend to vote No 20.8 (1296)
Would not vote 39.8 (1296)
High knowledge (versus low) 34.7 (1356)
Females 50.0 (1356)
Income (1st quintile) 19.8 (1356)
Income (2nd quintile) 15.3 (1356)
Income (3rd quintile) 21.2 (1356)
Income (4th quintile) 17.3 (1356)
Income (5th quintile) 13.7 (1356)
Income (missing) 12.7 (1356)
Personal economic situation got better 25.9 (1346)
Personal economic stayed the same 43.2 (1346)
Personal economic situation got worse 31.0 (1346)
Voted for Santos in 2014 32.6 (1345)
Voted for Zuluaga 8.5 (1345)
Voted for other candidate 20.1 (1345)
Did not vote 38.8 (1345)
Mean St. dev
Perception of political knowledge: 0.50 0.23
5 categories, from 0 (very low) to 1 (very high)
Frequency of attention to news in the media: 0.84 0.27
5 categories, from 0 (never) to 1 (daily)
Age (from 18 to 88) 39.52 15.13
Years of schooling (from 0 to 18) 9.75 4.22
Trust in the president (from 0 to 1) 0.32 0.32
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Table A2. Determinants of intentions to vote Yes to the peace agreement (logistic regressions).
Intentions to vote Yes
(1) (2) (3)
High knowledge 0.103** (0.035) 0.112** (0.035) 0.086** (0.032)
(odd ratios) 1.564** (0.238) 1.639** (0.255) 1.594* (0.288)
(log odds) 0.447** (0.152) 0.494** (0.156) 0.466* (0.181)
Gender (female) −0.086** (0.027) −0.087** (0.027) −0.066** (0.025)
Age 0.004*** (0.001) 0.004*** (0.001) 0.001 (0.001)
Education (years of schooling) −0.002 (0.004) 0.001 (0.004) 0.007 (0.004)
Income (ref = 1st quintile)
— 2nd quintile 0.018 (0.047) 0.037 (0.042)
— 3rd quintile 0.001 (0.043) 0.032 (0.040)
— 4th quintile −0.068 (0.045) −0.028 (0.042)
— 5th quintile −0.098* (0.040) −0.041 (0.041)
— Unreported/Don’t know −0.116** (0.044) −0.046 (0.043)
Economic situation (ref = same)
— Got better 0.096** (0.034) 0.061* (0.031)
— Got worse −0.001 (0.035) 0.041 (0.032)
Trust in the President (0–1) 0.446*** (0.038)
Past vote (ref = did not vote)
— Voted for Santos 0.207*** (0.036)
— Voted for Zuluaga −0.082 (0.042)
— Other vote 0.074 (0.040)
Interviewed last week
Constant (odds ratio) 0.359** (0.111) 0.304** (0.104) 0.100*** (0.036)
N 1283 1275 1261
Notes: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Coefficients are average marginal effects (except where otherwise specified) based on
logistic regressions, with standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable: intention to vote Yes in the peace agreement referendum
versus other choice. High knowledge equal to correct response to three questions on factual political knowledge (for question wording
see Appendix B). Stratified estimate using svyset command in Stata (number of strata = 6; number of unit per strata = 62). The sample
was selected with a multi-stage probability design, using geographical regions, municipality size, and urbanization as the main strata.
Respondents were selected in clusters for urban and rural areas. Within each cluster, six participants (three male, three female, divided
into three age groups) were randomly selected.
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Table A3. Determinants of intentions to vote Yes to the peace agreement (additional models).
Intentions to vote Yes
(1) (2) (3)
High knowledge 0.075* (0.031) 0.075* (0.031) 0.076* (0.032)
Gender (female) −0.059* (0.025) −0.059* (0.025) −0.060* (0.025)
Age 0.001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001)
Education (years of schooling) 0.007 (0.004) 0.008 (0.004) 0.007 (0.004)
Income (ref = 1st quintile)
— 2nd quintile 0.028 (0.042) 0.027 (0.042) 0.027 (0.042)
— 3rd quintile 0.038 (0.038) 0.038 (0.038) 0.037 (0.038)
— 4th quintile −0.011 (0.042) −0.012 (0.042) −0.014 (0.041)
— 5th quintile −0.039 (0.041) −0.036 (0.041) −0.039 (0.041)
— Unreported / Don’t know −0.044 (0.043) −0.043 (0.043) −0.044 (0.044)
Economic situation (ref = same)
— Got better 0.065* (0.030) 0.064* (0.030) 0.066* (0.031)
— Got worse 0.059 (0.033) 0.058 (0.033) 0.055 (0.033)
Trust in the President (0–1) 0.249*** (0.050) 0.250*** (0.050) 0.249*** (0.050)
Past vote (ref = did not vote)
— Voted for Santos 0.177*** (0.034) 0.176*** (0.034) 0.178*** (0.034)
— Voted for Zuluaga −0.079 (0.042) −0.080 (0.042) −0.078 (0.042)
— Other vote 0.071 (0.040) 0.070 (0.040) 0.069 (0.039)
Presidential approval (0 =min, 1 =max) 0.383*** (0.057) 0.384*** (0.057) 0.385*** (0.057)
Interviewed last week −0.045 (0.047)
Day of interview −0.001 (0.001)
N 1259 1259 1259
Notes: * p < 0.05, *** p < 0.001. Coefficients are average marginal effects (except where otherwise specified) based on logistic re-
gressions, with standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable: intention to vote Yes in the peace agreement referendum versus
other choice. Presidential approval: five-category variable (including the options “very good”, “good”, “neither good nor bad”, “bad”,
“very bad”), treated as a continuous variable, with values reversed and rescaled from 0 (“very bad”) to 1 (“very good”). Interviewed last
week: dummy variable with a value of 1 for those who have been interviewed in between the signature of the referendum in Cartagena
(September 27) and the day of the referendum (October 2). Stratified estimates using svyset command in Stata (number of strata = 6;
number of unit per strata = 62).
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Table A4. Alternative measures of political knowledge.
Intentions to vote Yes
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: perceived level of political knowledge
Perceived knowledge
— Log odds 0.813** (0.250) 0.808** (0.258) 0.762* (0.304)
— Odd ratios 2.256** (0.564) 2.243** (0.578) 2.143* (0.651)
— Marginal effects 0.188*** (0.057) 0.184** (0.058) 0.141* (0.055)
N 1273 1266 1252
Panel B: frequency of attention to news in the media
Attention to news
— Log odds 0.679** (0.246) 0.709** (0.255) 0.595* (0.278)
— Odd ratios 1.972** (0.485) 2.033** (0.518) 1.813* (0.503)
— Marginal effects 0.156** (0.056) 0.161** (0.057) 0.110* (0.050)
N 1281 1273 1259
Demographics Yes Yes Yes
Income No Yes Yes
Economic evaluations No Yes Yes
Trust in the President No No Yes
Past vote No No Yes
Notes: * p< 0.05, ** p< 0.01, *** p< 0.001. Coefficients based on logistic regressions, with standard errors in parentheses. Dependent
variable: intention to vote Yes in the peace agreement referendum versus other choice. Perceived knowledge level: 5 categories (“very
high”, “high”, “neither high or low”, “low”, “very low”), rescaled from 0 (very low) to 1 (very high). Frequency of attention to news in the
media: 5 categories (“daily”, “some times a week”, “some times a month”, “rarely”, “never”), rescaled from 0 (never) to 1 (daily). The
models include the same set of covariates included in Table A2. Stratified estimate using svyset command in Stata (number of strata = 6;
number of unit per strata = 62).
Table A5. Correlations between knowledge and intentions to vote Yes (vs. No).
Intentions to vote Yes (vs. No)
(1) (2) (3)
High knowledge 0.406†
(0.216)
Perceived knowledge 0.790†
(0.422)
Attention to news 0.536
(0.364)
Evaluation of the economy Yes Yes Yes
Socio-demographics Yes Yes Yes
Trust in the president Yes Yes Yes
Past vote Yes Yes Yes
N 768 765 767
Notes: † p < 0.1. Coefficients are log odds based on logistic regressions, with standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable:
intention to vote Yes in the peace agreement referendum versus vote No. Stratified estimate using svyset command in Stata (number
of strata = 6; number of unit per strata = 62).
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Table A6. Correlations between knowledge and voting intentions (multinomial logistic regressions).
Base category = vote No
(1) (2) (3)
Vote Yes Would not vote Vote Yes Would not vote Vote Yes Would not vote
High knowledge 0.339 −0.199
(0.224) (0.187)
Perceived knowledge 0.639 −0.177
(0.395) (0.372)
Attention to news 0.531 −0.088
(0.332) (0.329)
Base category = would not vote
(4) (5) (6)
Vote Yes Vote No Vote Yes Vote No Vote Yes Vote No
High knowledge 0.538** 0.199
(0.188) (0.187)
Perceived knowledge 0.816** 0.177
(0.330) (0.373)
Attention to news 0.619* 0.088
(0.308) (0.329)
Evaluation of the economy Yes Yes Yes
Socio-demographics Yes Yes Yes
Trust in the president Yes Yes Yes
Past vote Yes Yes Yes
N 1261 1252 1259
Notes: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01. Coefficients are log odds based on multinomial logistic regressions, with standard errors in parentheses.
Dependent variable: voting intentions, including three categories: intention to vote Yes, intention to vote No, and intention not to vote
in the peace agreement referendum. Stratified estimates using svyset command in Stata (number of strata = 6; number of unit per
strata = 62).
Table A7. Voting intentions by being a student or not a student.
Not a student Student
Intend to vote Yes 40.1 31.2
Intend to vote No 20.5 23.4
Intend not to vote 39.4 44.3
Total 100 100
(N) (1183) (113)
Notes: Unweighted percentages. P-value for Pearson’s chi-squared test: 0.231.
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Income (2nd quinle)
Income (3rd quinle)
Income (4th quinle)
Income (5th quinle)
Income (missing)
Economy got beer
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Voted for Zuluaga
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Figure A1. Determinants of intentions to vote Yes (versus vote No) to the peace agreement. Notes: Average marginal
effects based on logistic regressions (Model 1 in Table A5, N= 768). Dependent variable: intention to vote Yes in the peace
agreement referendum versus vote No. Horizontal lines correspond to 95 percent confidence intervals (thin lines) and
90 percent confidence intervals (thick lines).
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High knowledge
Female
Age
Years of Schooling
Income (2nd quinle)
Income (3rd quinle)
Income (4th quinle)
Income (5th quinle)
Income (missing)
Economy got beer
Economy got worse
Trust in the president
Voted for Santos
Voted for Zuluaga
Correlaons with intenons to vote Yes
Non-students (N = 1154) Students (N = 107)
–.4 –.2 0 .2 .4 .6 .8
Correlaons with intenons to vote Yes
Figure A2. Determinants of intentions to vote Yes for students and non-students (logistic regressions). Notes: Average
marginal effects based on the same logistic regression in Model 3 in Table A2, conducted with two separate samples: non-
students (left-hand panel, N = 1154), and students (right-hand panel, N = 107)40). Dependent variable: intention to vote
Yes in the peace agreement referendum. Horizontal lines correspond to 95 percent confidence intervals (thin lines) and
90 percent confidence intervals (thick lines).
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Appendix B: Study 1 (LAPOP), question wording.
(Authors’ own translation. Original wording in Spanish in italics)
Intention to vote in the peace agreement referendum
Q: In the event that a popular vote will be held to endorse the peace agreement between the government and the
FARC, how would you vote?
A: I would vote in favor / I would vote against / I would not vote / DK / NA
Q: Y en el evento en que se realizara una votación popular para refrendar el acuerdo de paz entre el gobierno y las FARC,
¿cómo votaría usted?
A: Votaría a favor / Votaría en contra / No votaría / No sabe (no leer) / No responde (no leer)
Factual political knowledge (3 items)
Q: What is the name of the current president of the United States of America?
Q: On what continent is Nigeria?
Q: How long is the presidential term in Colombia?
A: Correct / Incorrect / DK / NA
Q: ¿Cómo se llama el actual presidente de los Estados Unidos de América?
Q: ¿En qué continente queda Nigeria?
Q: ¿Cuánto tiempo dura el período presidencial en Colombia?
A: Correcto / Incorrecto / No sabe (no leer) / No responde (no leer)
Self-reported perceived political knowledge
Q: Using the scale presented below, please rate your perception of your level of political knowledge
A: Very high / High / Neither high nor low / Low / Very low
Q: Usando la escala que se presenta abajo, por favor califique su percepción sobre el nivel de conocimiento político del
entrevistado
A: Muy alto / Alto / Ni alto ni bajo / Bajo / Muy bajo
Frequency of attention to news in the media
Q: How often do you follow the news, whether on television, radio, newspapers or the Internet?
A: Daily / Some times a week / Some times a month / Rarely / Never / DK /NA
Q: ¿Con qué frecuencia sigue las noticias, ya sea en la televisión, la radio, los periódicos o el Internet?
A: Diariamente / Algunas veces a la semana / Algunas veces al mes / Rara vez / Nunca / No sabe (no leer) / No responde
(no leer)
Personal economic evaluation
Q: Do you think your current economic situation is better, the same or worse than twelve months ago?
A: Better / Equal / Worse / DK / NA
Q: ¿Considera usted que su situación económica actual es mejor, igual o peor que la de hace doce meses?
A: Mejor / Igual / Peor / No sabe (no leer) / No responde (no leer)
Trust in the President
Q: I’m going to ask you a series of questions, and I would like you to answer using the numbers on this scale. Remember
that you can use any number. To what extent do you trust the president?
A: 1 (Nothing) / ... / 7 (Much)
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Q: Voy a hacerle una serie de preguntas, y le voy a pedir que para darme su respuesta utilice los números de esta escalera.
Recuerde que puede usar cualquier número. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en el presidente?
A: 1 (Nada) / … / 7 (Mucho)
Past vote in 2014 presidential election
Q: Did you vote in the last presidential elections of 2014?
A: Yes, I voted / No, I did not vote
Q: Who did you vote for President in the last presidential elections of 2014? [Do not read alternatives]
A: (00) None (went to vote but left the ballot blank) / (97) None (annulled vote) / (801) Clara López / (802) Enrique
Peñalosa / (803) Marta Lucía Ramírez / (804) Juan Manuel Santos / (805) Oscar Iván Zuluaga / (877) Other / DK /NA
Q: ¿Votó usted en las últimas elecciones presidenciales de 2014?
A: Sí votó / No votó
Q: ¿Por quién votó para Presidente en las últimas elecciones presidenciales de 2014? [No leer alternativas]
A: (00) Ninguno (fue a votar pero dejó la boleta en blanco) / (97) Ninguno (anuló su voto) / (801) Clara López / (802)
Enrique Peñalosa / (803) Marta Lucía Ramírez / (804) Juan Manuel Santos / (805) Oscar Iván Zuluaga / (877) Otro /
(888888) No sabe [NO LEER] / (988888) No responde [NO LEER] / (999999) Inaplicable (No votó) [NO LEER]
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Appendix C. Study 2 (experiment), analysis.
Table C1. Summary statistics.
Frequency Percentage
(total N = 478) (total = 100)
Females 278 58.2
High education 253 52.9
Employed (not a student) 205 42.9
Unemployed (not a student) 69 14.4
Student 204 42.7
Living in Bogotá 313 65.5
Median (mean) St. dev.
Age 32 (36) 15.8
Notes: High education corresponds to “Especializacion/maestria” or above.
Table C2. Balance tests (multinomial logistic regression).
Group assignment
(reference category = control group)
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4
(opportunity—PRO) (opportunity—CON) (risk—PRO) (risk—CON)
Gender (female) −0.049 0.279 −0.394 0.011
(0.315) (0.319) (0.310) (0.313)
Age 0.002 0.016 0.008 0.004
(0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014)
High education −0.081 −0.404 −0.302 −0.649*
(0.320) (0.316) (0.316) (0.315)
Employment (ref = working, not student)
— Unemployed, not student −0.599 −1.158* −0.743 −0.595
(0.500) (0.505) (0.475) (0.472)
— Student 0.230 −0.082 −0.107 −0.178
(0.365) (0.366) (0.364) (0.365)
Living in Bogotá 0.111 0.036 0.075 0.091
(0.329) (0.326) (0.322) (0.327)
Constant −0.080 −0.329 0.220 0.307
(0.695) (0.695) (0.663) (0.674)
Pseudo R2 .012
N 478
Notes: * p < .05. Multinomial logistic regression of random assignment to treatment groups on socio-demographic covariates. Coeffi-
cients are log odds. Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table C3. Treatment effects on support for peace agreement (average marginal effects).
Intentions to vote Yes
(Model 2) (Model 4)
Treatment groups (ref: control)
Opportunity (PRO)
— All respondents 0.090* (0.050)
— Low knowledge 0.257*** (0.083)
—High knowledge −0.001 (0.059)
Opportunity (CON)
— All respondents 0.032 (0.052)
— Low knowledge 0.126 (0.094)
—High knowledge −0.032 (0.062)
Risk (PRO)
— All respondents −0.001 (0.055)
— Low knowledge 0.062 (0.108)
—High knowledge −0.045 (0.062)
Risk (CON)
— All respondents 0.055 (0.052)
— Low knowledge 0.149 (0.099)
—High knowledge −0.004 (0.058)
N 472 472
Notes: *** p < 0.01. Average marginal effects calculated on logistic regressions in models 2 and 4 in Table 2.
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Appendix D.Why con arguments did not influence respondents?
We attempted to investigate why the arguments used by the opponents of the referendum did not reduce support for
the peace agreement within our sample. A possible explanation concerns the fact that our sample included a large share
of supporters of the peace agreement who might have rejected No campaign arguments because they “disconfirmed”
what they already believed in. Indeed, we find that those who read a con argument stressing the risks of voting Yes spent
more time replying to the voting question compared to the control group (see Table D1 below). This finding supports
the idea that the participants engaged in rejecting counter-attitudinal arguments—a so-called “disconfirmation bias” (e.g.,
Redlawsk, 2002)—and is consistent with the fact that several arguments of the No campaign were intended to cause fear
(Arjona, 2016), thus potentially leading to opposite reactions in the Yes camp.
On the other hand, we also find that those who read the risk argument supporting the peace agreement spent more
time replying to the voting question. This finding suggests that risk messages in general implied longer information pro-
cessing, which did not necessarily translate into persuasion, in line with theoretical expectations (Hypothesis 2b) and with
research on negative information (Ito, Larsen, Smith, & Cacioppo, 1998). In other words, participants might have found
the risk arguments more difficult to process and, therefore, also less convincing.
Table D1. Regression of time spent replying to voting question on group assignment.
Time spent replying
(1) (2)
Treatment groups (ref: control)
— Group 1 (opportunity—PRO) −0.951 −0.748
(1.490) (1.484)
— Group 2 (opportunity—CON) 0.220 0.053
(1.482) (1.466)
— Group 3 (risk—PRO) 2.969** 3.121**
(1.482) (1.473)
— Group 4 (risk—CON) 4.060*** 3.672**
(1.474) (1.465)
Demographics No Yes
Constant 11.984*** 12.649***
(1.048) (2.552)
R2 .035 .062
N 470 464
Notes: ** p< 0.05, *** p< 0.01. Coefficients fromOLS regressions with standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable: time spent
replying to voting question measured in hundredth of seconds, values trimmed at 1percent and 99 percent levels. Model 2 includes the
same set of covariates included in Model 2 in Table 2.
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Appendix E. Study 2 (experiment), question wording and information stimuli.
Main variables used in the experiment (original wording in Spanish in Italics)
Vote
The question for the upcoming Plebiscite on the 2nd ofOctober is: “Do you support the Final Agreement for the termination
of the conflict and the building of a stable and lasting peace (Art. 1, decree 1391, 2016)”. If the Plebiscitewas held tomorrow,
you would vote:
□ Yes
□ No
□ Do not know
□ Will not vote
La pregunta del Plebiscito del próximo 2 de octubre es: ”Apoya usted el Acuerdo Final para la terminación del conflicto y la
construcción de una paz estable y duradera? (Art. 1 decreto 1391 de 2016)”.	Si el Plebiscito fuera mañana, usted votaría:
□ Sí
□ No
□ No sabe
□ No va a votar
Knowledge
Which of the following was NOT one of the 6 items of the negotiation agenda?
□ Political participation
□ Illicit drugs
□ Education policies
□ Integral agrarian reform
□ Do not know
¿Cuál de los siguientes NO fue uno de los 6 puntos de la agenda de negociación?
□ Participación política
□ Drogas ilícitas
□ Políticas educativas
□ Reforma rural integral
□ No sabe
In which month was the Peace Agreement signed?
□ September 2016
□ June 2016
□ April 2016
□ January 2016
□ Do not know
¿En qué mes se firmó el Acuerdo de paz?
□ Septiembre 2016
□ Junio 2016
□ Abril 2016
□ Enero 2016
□ No sabe
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Texts used in the experiment (original wording in Spanish in Italics)
Group 1 (PRO—opportunity)
Those who support the Yes argue that voting Yes in the Plebiscite is a historical opportunity to end with violence in the
country. They assert that it is the key for bringing peace to the rural areas and for the displaced population to return to their
lands, without poverty, without landmines and without illicit crops. They anticipate that victims will know what happened
with their beloved ones, and reparation and non-recurrence will be guaranteed. They see in the Plebiscite the opportunity
to decide whether we want to stop war or continue with it.
Quienes apoyan el Sí sostienen que votar Sí en el Plebiscito es una oportunidad histórica para acabar con la violencia en el
país. Afirman que es la clave para llevar la paz al campo y para que los desplazados regresen a trabajar a sus tierras, sin
pobreza, sin minas y sin cultivos ilícitos. Anticipan que las víctimas sabrán qué pasó con sus seres queridos, serán reparadas
y se les garantizará la no repetición. Ven en el plebiscito la oportunidad para decidir si queremos finalizar o continuar con
la guerra.
Group 2 (PRO—risk)
Those who support the Yes argue that voting No in the Plebiscite would mean throwing away four years of negotiations.
They affirm that the No would take us to a blind alley and eventually lead us back to armed confrontation, condemning
future generations to more years of war. They highlight that we would lose the trust and support of the international
community and predict that the insurgents would not seat again to renegotiate.
Quienes apoyan el Sí sostienen que votar No en el plebiscito sería tirar por la borda cuatro años de negociaciones. Afirman
que el No nos conduciría a un callejón sin salida y a un eventual retorno a la confrontación armada, condenando futuras
generaciones a más años de guerra. Resaltan que perderíamos la confianza y el apoyo de la comunidad internacional y
auguran que la guerrilla no volvería a sentarse a renegociar.
Group 3 (CON—opportunity)
Those who support the No argue that rejecting the agreements does not mean going back to war. They see it as an op-
portunity to renegotiate, addressing several aspects of the Agreement that they find problematic and involving other
representatives of the society that were not present in the process. They highlight that the No is an opportunity to de-
mand peace with dignity.
Quienes apoyan el No sostienen que rechazar los acuerdos no es volver a la guerra. Lo ven como una oportunidad para
renegociar, replanteando varios puntos del Acuerdo que encuentran problemáticos e incorporando otros representantes
de la sociedad que no estuvieron presentes en el proceso. Resaltan que el No es una oportunidad para solicitar una paz
digna.
Group 4 (CON—risk)
Those who support the No argue that the agreements are bad for the country. They affirm that if we approve them,
impunity will rise as the high commanders of the guerrilla will not go to jail. They also highlight that it would damage
democracy as the rebels would be awarded with the possibility of participating in politics. This would go against the Con-
stitution and question fundamental values of our society such as private property.
Quienes apoyan el No sostienen que los acuerdos son perjudiciales para el país. Afirman que de aceptarlos la impunidad
en el país incrementaría porque los máximos comandantes de la guerrilla no pagarían cárcel. Resaltan también que se
deterioraría la democracia porque a los guerrilleros se les premiaría con la posibilidad de hacer política, lo que atentaría
contra la Constitución y pondría en riesgo aspectos fundamentales de la sociedad como la propiedad privada.
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